Slides (PDF) · Student tasks · Български
Set aside about 15 minutes to read and reflect. The text follows the presentation “Informed consent” (Class 2). Bulgarian law is the reference throughout; foreign rules are marked as comparative, and quotations of Bulgarian acts are working translations. Before every intervention, the class asks five questions: Who decides? Does he understand? Is the choice free? What exactly is authorised? How is it recorded?
Consent is a process, not a signature
Informed consent is the voluntary decision of a person with decision-making capacity to accept a specific medical intervention, after receiving and understanding information about its nature, purpose, benefits, risks and alternatives. The Health Act states the rule simply: medical activities are carried out after informed consent has been expressed by the patient (Art. 87(1)). The Oviedo Convention adds that consent must be free and informed and may be freely withdrawn at any time (Art. 5); it has been in force for Bulgaria since 1 August 2003. The milestones run from Schloendorff (USA, 1914 — self-determination over one’s body) and the Nuremberg Code (1947) to Salgo (USA, 1957), which gave us the term “informed consent”.
Consent rests on four ethical foundations: autonomy (the person decides what happens to his body, even against the doctor’s recommendation), well-being (only the patient can judge how a risk fits his values, work and family), trust (honest, unpressured communication supports the disclosure on which good care depends) and dignity and integrity (operating without permission treats the person merely as a means). Hard paternalism — overriding an autonomous choice “for the patient’s good” — is almost never justified today. In shared decision-making the clinician brings evidence, options and uncertainty and the patient brings goals and values. Consent authorises an offered intervention; it does not oblige the physician to provide clinically inappropriate treatment.
Valid consent has five elements: sufficient information, understanding, decision-making capacity, voluntariness and a specific expression of will. Each has a typical defect — an omitted material fact, a patient who repeats the words of the form without grasping them, an acute problem that impairs judgement, fear or manipulation, or a general signature used for a different intervention.
Information, form and scope
The treating physician (or dentist) must explain the diagnosis and nature of the disease; the aims and nature of treatment, reasonable alternatives, expected results and prognosis; the potential risks, including side effects, pain and discomfort; and the probability of benefit and the risks of other methods or of refusal — in good time and in a form that enables free choice (Art. 88). For surgery, general anaesthesia and other high-risk methods, the information and consent are written (Art. 89(1)). The form documents the conversation; it does not replace it. Consent may also be implied by conduct for simple, low-risk acts, but silence is not consent, admission to hospital is not blanket consent, and emergency authority is not “implied consent”. The patient may decline information about his disease and prognosis — the right not to know — unless his condition endangers others; this is recorded in writing, and he may authorise in writing another person to be informed instead (Art. 92), who receives information but does not thereby decide.
Consent authorises a defined intervention, not “whatever proves necessary”. Foreseeable extensions are discussed and written in advance; a materially different intervention needs new information and consent. Understanding is checked with plain language, natural frequencies and teach-back (“tell me in your own words what we will do and what can go wrong”), which checks the doctor’s explanation, not the patient. Consent is not a waiver: a disclosed complication of a properly performed intervention does not in itself establish negligence, but consent never covers negligence.
Four cases illustrate this block. A surgeon asks the ward nurse to “get the written consent”; the patient signs unread and later develops a wound infection that was listed but never explained — the complaint about information is well-founded, because the duty to inform lies with the treating physician (Art. 88(1)). A man with chronic myeloid leukaemia is fully informed about the risks of stem-cell transplantation but never told that oral tyrosine-kinase inhibitors are the standard first-line treatment — his consent was not informed, because Art. 88 requires information about reasonable alternatives, and omitting an option the doctor does not prefer is covert paternalism. A man who chose angioplasty after a proper explanation dies of a disclosed vessel rupture — the consent was valid, and respect for autonomy includes the right to accept a risk the family would not accept. During a polypectomy under anaesthesia, an early cancer of the turbinate is found — the surgeons may not extend the operation, because an early cancer is not an immediate threat to life and the wife cannot consent for an adult who will regain capacity within hours.
Capacity, minors and representation
Two concepts must not be confused. Legal capacity to act is a status set by the Persons and Family Act: a child under 14 acts through a parent or guardian; a minor aged 14 to 18 acts with a parent’s or curator’s consent; an adult has full capacity; and interdiction is decided only by a court. Decision-making capacity is a clinical judgement — for this decision, at this time. A diagnosis, old age, an unusual choice or disagreement with the doctor do not prove incapacity; capacity can be lost temporarily (delirium, hypoxia, sedation) and regained. It is assessed through four abilities — to understand, appreciate, reason and express a choice (Appelbaum & Grisso, 1988) — more carefully the more serious the consequences; but a refusal is not in itself evidence of incapacity. First, make the decision possible: treat pain and delirium, provide hearing aids, an interpreter, time and a trusted person.
Who consents is set by Art. 87. An adult with capacity consents alone; relatives have no right of veto. A minor aged 14–18 consents together with a parent (Art. 87(2)). A child under 14 is represented by a parent or guardian (Art. 87(4)). Special rules apply to children placed outside the family and to persons with a mental disorder whose incapacity has been established by a court. A relative of an adult is not a legal representative: he tells the team about the patient’s values but does not consent for him. Whoever consents, the patient is involved as far as his capacity allows (Oviedo, Art. 6).
From the age of 16, a minor may alone receive the counselling, preventive examinations and tests listed in Ordinance No. 8/2018 — on mental, sexual, reproductive and dental health, and tests including HIV and a pregnancy test (Art. 87(3)). If a disease is found, the physician must notify the parent (Ordinance, Art. 5), so absolute secrecy cannot be promised. Treatment, prescriptions and invasive procedures still need both the minor’s and a parent’s consent. Since 22.12.2023 nobody under 18 can marry in Bulgaria (Family Code, Art. 6(1)).
The cases show the lines. A 10-year-old with a severed radial artery whose parents cannot be reached is operated on and transfused without consent, because life is threatened (Art. 89(2); Blood, Blood Donation and Blood Transfusion Act, Art. 32) — the teacher’s signature has no legal value. A 16-year-old may be examined and counselled alone, but an IUD insertion needs a parent’s consent too. A 17-year-old asking for circumcision needs a parent’s consent: the age of 18 is a fixed legal line, and his own consent is necessary, not mere “assent”. A 17-year-old girl living with her partner after a religious ceremony needs a parent’s consent for diagnosis and surgery; the partner has no legal role, and if she is at risk the physician must notify the Social Assistance Directorate (Child Protection Act, Art. 7).
Refusal, emergency and treatment against the will
The patient, or his parent, guardian or curator, may refuse at any time the proposed care or its continuation (Art. 90(1)). The refusal is recorded with signatures, or by the physician and a witness if the person will not sign (Art. 90(2)–(3)), and can itself be withdrawn at any time. When a patient refuses necessary treatment without knowing its dangerous consequences, the physician must explain the unfavourable prognosis in a way he understands — unless he expressly declines that information (Code of Professional Ethics, Art. 29). Refusal ends one intervention, not the physician’s care: alternatives, palliation and the open door remain.
The key distinction of the class is between two articles. Under Art. 89(2), consent cannot be obtained: life is immediately threatened, the patient cannot express consent, and a required representative cannot be reached in time — the team acts in the patient’s health interest without written consent (the unconscious trauma patient; the child whose parents cannot be reached). Under Art. 90(4), consent has been refused and life is threatened — the head of the medical establishment may decide on life-saving treatment. That is a discretionary decision of a designated person, not an automatic power of every clinician (refusal of transfusion; parents refusing treatment for a child). Art. 90(4) is read together with the Constitution (Art. 52(4)) and Oviedo (Art. 5). For transfusion, the special Blood Act regulates consent, emergency and refusal (Arts 31–33) without providing for overriding a refusal — its relation to Art. 90(4) is a question of interpretation. The European Court of Human Rights has held that a refusal must be examined for whether it is free, informed, specific, current and applicable (Pindo Mulla v. Spain, Grand Chamber, 2024).
Treatment against the will may be provided only in cases determined by law (Health Act, Art. 91; Constitution, Art. 52(4)): compulsory isolation for listed infectious diseases (Art. 61), emergency psychiatric help when there is a direct and immediate danger (Art. 153), temporary placement for up to 24 hours, extendable once by 48 hours with a judge’s permission (Art. 154), and compulsory treatment only by court decision (Arts 155–156). None of these is a general authority for any treatment against the will. Bulgarian law has no general statute on advance directives, but previously expressed wishes must be taken into account (Oviedo, Art. 9).
Four cases are worked in small groups. Parents who are Jehovah’s Witnesses refuse a transfusion for their 10-year-old son — they may refuse for themselves what they may not refuse for their child; the head of the establishment may decide on life-saving treatment (Art. 90(4)), and a child at risk triggers the duty to notify the Social Assistance Directorate. An 84-year-old veteran with mild cognitive decline refuses amputation for spreading gangrene — diagnosis and age do not prove incapacity; the team must find out whether “it will heal on its own” is a failure to appreciate the facts or a value choice, and must never amputate merely because the refusal seems unwise. A man who drove into a pole in a suicide attempt refuses surgery — suicidal intent raises urgent concern about capacity but does not by itself establish incapacity; with refusal and a threat to life, the head may decide under Art. 90(4), and psychiatric measures alone do not authorise surgery. An unconscious 45-year-old needs either amputation or a riskier reconstruction while his parents and wife disagree — neither can consent for him; if life is immediately threatened the team decides in his health interest (Art. 89(2)), the relatives are witnesses of his values, and his earlier wishes count.
Documentation and responsibility
The record should show what was proposed, the benefits, risks, alternatives and consequences of refusal; what support was given and how understanding was checked; what the patient chose and with which limits; who was present; and the capacity assessment when there was doubt. Consent is revisited when the intervention changes, new information appears, the patient’s condition or preferences change, or much time passes. The duty to inform is the treating physician’s; the team supports it. Research is a different regime: medical experiments require voluntary written consent (Constitution, Art. 29(2); Health Act, Art. 199(1)) — Class 6.
Before opening the student tasks, try to answer in three sentences: why a nurse cannot “collect the consent” for surgery; what a 16-year-old may decide alone and what she may not; and how Art. 89(2) differs from Art. 90(4).